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The Public-Private Distinction
in American Law and Life
ALAN FREEMAN AND ELIZABETH MENSCH*"
N OTHING is more central to our experience in American culture than
the split between public and private.' It is the premise which lies at
the foundation of American legal thought, and it shapes the way in
which we relate to each other in our daily lives. We consistently take for
granted that there is both a public realm and a private realm. In the
private realm we assume that we operate within a protected sphere of
autonomy, free to make self-willed individual choices and to feel secure
against the encroachment of others. Private law, for example contract
law, serves as a helpmate in this realm, facilitating and securing the au-
tonomous world of private decision-making. In contrast, the public realm
is a world of government institutions, obliged to serve the public interest
rather than private aims. For the most part the public realm is accounta-
ble to the private and obligated to limit its intrusion into the world of
private choice. Occasionally, however, it is supposed to override the pri-
vate sphere, either to serve a greater public good or to solve problems
that are poorly handled by private decision-making.
* Professors of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buf-
falo. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the City University of New York School of Law
in April 1986, at the Cornell University School of Law in November 1986, at the University of
Toronto Law School in October 1987, at Yale Law School in March, 1988, and at Osgoode Hall Law
School in April 1988. The authors are grateful to Sara Nichols for her thoughtful and helpful
efforts. An earlier version of this Article appeared in TiEKUN, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 24 (1988).
1. That our discussion is about a peculiarly American version of public-private was emphasized
to us by David Fraser, from his Canadian perspective. It is not his position that Canadians do not
draw the public-private line. They simply draw it in a different place. But where they draw it indi-
cates a qualitatively different ideological structure, one in which the public is experienced more
directly by people. It is also experienced more frequently. While in many, if not most instances, this
experience is little more than welfare statism, the room for an alternative, more political-communi-
tarian experience is there, and is lived. For a fuller account of his position, see Fraser, And Now for
Something Completely Different: Judging Interpretation and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 7 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF AccEss TO JUSTICE (1988) (in press).
Jane Smith, a former student, reminded us that one's experience of public-private in American
culture may well differ according to one's situation with respect to race, gender, or class. For further
discussion of this issue, see R. SENNETT & J. COBB, THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS (1972);
Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working-Class Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL
STUD. F. 59 (1985).
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It is important to recognize the role of the private-public split in
legal thought, but its real significance lies in the powerful way it informs
our daily experience of the world. It is part of our lived reality to know
that the public realm is different from the private, that they both exist,
but are separate from each other, with different things happening in each
one. That knowledge, in turn, molds our relationships even to our closest
friends. We were reminded of that fact recently, during a phone conver-
sation with a good friend. We had just produced a new baby, a fourth son
in our busy household, and our friend said she hoped we would now stop
reproducing. Then she quickly retreated into an apology, afraid that she
had offended us. At first her fear seemed puzzling, but then it made
sense. In our culture one is not supposed to tell people what one thinks of
their reproductive behavior. Family planning choices take place in the
world of family privacy, which is a world of private, autonomous deci-
sion-making. Even friends are expected not to intrude into that protected
sphere with inappropriate comments about the adequacy of one's birth
control. To do so is to violate the norms of privacy. Our friend's apolo-
getic manner is what we mean by taking the public-private split for
granted as part of our daily experience.
A few moments of reflection, however, show the extent to which
that supposed realm of privacy is a product of cultural contingency, not
objective reality. For example, since reproduction is the process by which
a society reconstitutes itself, many cultures consider family planning an
obvious matter of social concern and choose either to encourage or dis-
courage large families. Even where matters of sexuality and reproduction
are ostensibly understood as private, their experience is a socially consti-
tuted one. Unless one is prepared not only to head for the wilderness, but
also to discard all previously acquired cultural baggage, the notion of
raising children in pure privacy is an impossibility. We look, often franti-
cally, to social experience for guidance and understanding of the parental
role. The fact that we run to look up problems in Dr. Spock is more than
just a metaphor for the social dimension of the experience. The private-
ness of reproduction is part of our consciousness, not a natural reality.
Once the public-private split is recognized to be merely an artificial
construct, new possibilities for human contact are born. Erecting fantasy
walls of privacy around each other causes the denial of access. Privacy
means alienation. If some of those walls were dissolved and traditionally
private questions were transformed into community concerns, then some
of our experience of personal separation might turn into an experience of
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connection. Because our sense of ourselves and others would change, our
world would be altered.
Instead of seeking alternative connections through transformation
of the public realm into one of authentic community, many of us seek
authentic experience by retreating or escaping into the most private
realms. In effect, we create a subset of the private in which real mutuality
serves as an antidote to the alienated world of competitive, possessive
individualism. Thus the family is experienced as the "haven in a heartless
world."2 Similarly, many of us try to find true meaning through religious
experiences and the social life that accompanies them.3 Or, alternatively,
many of us think we achieve real interpersonal connection in the most
private realm of all, when we fall in love.4 Yet the relegation of those
experiences to the supposed realm of pure privacy serves always to limit
their significance. Because they are private they are contained, trivialized
and rendered irrelevant to the real world, where love has no place.
Nevertheless, because our present world is dominated by the forms
of liberal legalism,5 which defines us as bearers of private rights, the rhet-
oric of militant privatism has provided an important weapon in specific
contexts. In the abortion area, for example, gaining the right to private,
autonomous, reproductive choice has seemed an important feminist vic-
tory. Yet the language of privatism is a double-edged sword. As women
who struggle alone to raise children know, reproductive choice, con-
ceived only as a private right, serves to isolate and to negate the right to
call on the community for help and for a sharing of responsibility. To
have the private choice is also to be left alone with it. Moreover, in the
economic realm the rhetoric of privacy has traditionally been used to
transform the social reality of poverty into a believed fantasy about au-
tonomous choice, in which poverty results from individual failure. It is
2. See C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED (1977). See also J.
DONZELoT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (1979); E. ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY, AND
PERSONAL LIFE (1976).
3. For some different perspectives on the question, see F. FITZGERALD, CITIES ON A HILL 121-
201 (1986) (describing Jerry Falwell, his church and community); A. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1984) (dealing with the black church and the civil rights movement);
Ferber, Religious Revival on the Left, THE NATION, July 6, 1985, at 6 (describing the relation be-
tween religion and left politics). See also B. BERGER, THE SURVIVAL OF A COUNTERCULTURE:
IDEOLOGICAL WORK AND EVERYDAY LIFE AMONG RURAL COMMUNARDS (1981) (study of the
rural commune as a family-religion hybrid, and its relation to the outside world).
4. See D. TENNov, LOVE AND LIMERANCE: THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING IN LOVE (1979). For
a dialectical engagement with the issue, see D. Fraser, What's Love Got to Do With It? Critical Legal
Studies, Feminist Discourse and the Ethic of Solidarity I1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 270-80 (1978).
1987]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
therefore not surprising that the formal freedom to obtain an abortion
does not mean the right to have one paid for by the community - the
poverty of the woman who cannot afford an abortion is her own private
problem. That was the lesson learned when the supposedly liberating de-
cision of Roe v. Wade6 was followed by Harris v. McRae,7 which entitled
the government to deny health benefits to cover the expenses of even
"medically necessary" abortions.
Thus, within liberal legalism, privacy may be a weapon for gaining
freedom from others in the short run, but it may also provide justification
for abandonment by others in the long run. This short-run, long-run
problem can best be understood against a more general theoretical back-
drop. For the purpose of understanding the consciousness of private
right, nothing has really improved upon Marx's classic account, On the
Jewish Question.8 The essay remains the fullest account of liberal ideol-
ogy understood at the core level of experience. Despite the essay's heavy,
dated Hegelian terminology (state and civil society rather than simply
public and private, for example), it still remains the fullest account of
liberal ideology.
Marx begins by describing the emancipation of the political state
from the various status qualifications which once constituted it. Under
the old feudal, hierarchical model, political life was inseparable from gra-
dations of social privilege based on religious, economic and class back-
ground. Political status was bound up with social status, so that religious
and property qualifications were attached to the right to vote. In con-
trast, in the new liberal state, citizenship was freed of those qualifications.
As a citizen, the Jew was as free as the Christian, and the poor person
was on an equal footing with the landed aristocrat. Thus, the state be-
came the arena for the exercise of free political participation and the real-
ization of true community. In that sphere, at least, alienating divisions of
religion and class were dissolved. That liberation of the state was a "great
step forward," a step away from separateness and toward community, or,
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
8. K. MARX, On the Jewish Question, in WRMNGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY
AND SOCIETY 216 (1967). See also 1 L. KOLAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM: ITS OR.-
GINS, GROWTH, AND DISSOLUTION 122-27 (1981) (further discussion of the public-private distinc-
tion).
For a critique suggesting that both Marx and Marxism all too easily replicated the public-private
dichotomy as systematic oppression and domination of women by men, see A. GOULDNER, THE




using Marx's term, "species being." 9
Nevertheless, the emancipation of the state is not complete human
emancipation because the old distinctions are in fact retained outside the
state, in the form of private rights. Religion, rather than being abolished,
becomes a private whim, an expression of purely subjective, individual-
ized values. Similarly, while property is removed, as a precondition of
formal political participation, it is nevertheless retained as a protected
right, with which the state cannot interfere. Property as private right,
stripped of the old notions of moral-political obligation (of, e.g., the feu-
dal lords to their serfs) both presupposes and legitimates a realm of ego-
ism, self-interest and atomization. Thus, in the private sphere there is
only "bellum omnium contra omnes," 10 as Marx says, "no longer the
essence of community but the essence of division."'1
Marx emphasizes the fact that he is describing concrete changes that
took place with the emergence of liberalism, but he is also describing a
change in consciousness, a change in the way that we experience the
world. The split between public and private lies at the heart of that new
liberal consciousness, for it means that we simultaneously view others as
both fellow citizens in a true community and as separate, antagonistic,
private others. Thus, as Marx says, "man leads a double life .... In the
political community he regards himself as a communal being; but in civil
society he is active as a private individual, treats other men as means...
and becomes the plaything of alien powers."' 2
Moreover, because the most important daily activities-work, fam-
ily life, moral choice-are all experienced as private and apolitical, the
experience of community becomes increasingly abstract, realized at the
level of fantasy and ritual rather than as a concrete reality. Most citizens
have little direct experience of participation in collective decision mak-
ing, so the citizen becomes "an imaginary member of an imagined sover-
eignty" with no direct control over the concrete facts of social life.13 The
state itself also becomes an abstract alien, rather than an arena for the
experience of a community.
Notably, the public-private split also replicates itself within the
realm of the private, most starkly in the market-family dichotomy. 4 In
9. K. MARX, supra note 8, at 226-28, 241.
10. Id. at 227.
11. Id. (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 225 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 226.
14. For this section we are indebted to Fran Olsen for her thorough and sensitive treatment of
1987]
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theory, the market offers a free range for atomized, competitive self-inter-
est, while in contrast the family gives expression to the yearning for
warmth, selflessness and interconnectedness. Thus conceived, that di-
chotomy in turn represents the conventional, stereotypical split between
male and female roles. In the market, the most public and powerful of
the private realms, men can play out their maleness by being aggressive
and dominating others with their superior skill and economic advantage,
while, contained within the family sphere, women play out their female
roles by providing a safe, nurturing home. Therefore, the traditional ri-
gidity of gender identification is inextricably linked to the supposed
boundary between market and family, which in turn is an integral subset
of the basic liberal split between public and private.
A crucial ingredient in liberal ideology, as described by Marx, is the
fact that the public-private split actually entails a tripartite structure of
self, state and other. Because of that structure there is always an alienat-
ing third which mediates the relationship between self and other.I5 Other
private individuals are experienced, not in direct relationship, but rather
by reference to a state that will set the ground rules of the relationship
and determine the extent of each person's rights and duties. In every
relationship the state is a potential ally and a potential foe to each person.
At the same time, the other as citizen in the state, as part of the collectiv-
ity, is always experienced simultaneously by reference to the world of
private right-holders. The state can never be simply the community, be-
cause the community is always composed of individuals who also define
themselves as right-holders, with private interests potentially at odds
with each other and with the collective experience. Just as each of us
leads a double life as both citizen and private right-holder, so we must
constantly experience others, not simply as people, but rather as both
members of the democratic collectivity and as atomized individuals.
There are four important notions which help to maintain that tri-
adic structure within our consciousness and make it powerful as ideol-
ogy. Those four can be termed limit, illusion, legitimation and
contradiction. They operate simultaneously at the level of legal thought
and at the level of day-to-day consciousness.
The first, the notion of limit, means there will be a line separating
the issue. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 1497 (1983).
15. See J. P. SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICAL REASON 100-09 (1982); see also F. JAMESON,
MARXISM AND FORM 206-305 (1972); M. POSTER, EXISTENTIAL MARXISM IN POSTWAR FRANCE:
FROM SARTRE TO ALTHUSSER 264-305 (1977).
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public from private, a boundary where one ends and the other begins.
That line can be moved dramatically over time, and it can sometimes be
perceived as hard to find, or quite fuzzy around the edges, rather than as
a clear either-or boundary. Differences in where the line is drawn or how
it is perceived may be interesting and significant for some purposes, but
the key point is that the line is always felt to be present, somewhere. On
the public side of the line we assume that there is an obligation to act
responsibly, with a sense of accountability for harsh or oppressive conse-
quences to the community of others. The fact of a boundary, however,
means that at some point, accountability ends. When the line between
public and private is crossed, community concern for the outcomes pro-
duced by social life ceases because those outcomes are conceived as
merely the result of private choice.
The "state action" cases are all cases about the dual message of re-
sponsibility and limit. 6 In those cases the Supreme Court has been called
upon to interpret the provision of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution mandating that "No State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."17
That provision makes racial discrimination and other deprivations of
rights a matter of public concern if the entity responsible for the discrimi-
nation can be regarded in some sense as the state, i.e., public not private.
In many instances the legal line between state action and the private
realm has shifted dramatically, often in ways we want to see as
progressive.
One can applaud, for example, the change in doctrine from the
1880s to the 1960s. In 1875 Congress had enacted a law barring discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation such as hotels and theaters. 8
The theory was that Congress had been granted that power by the Civil
War amendments, especially the fourteenth amendment. In The Civil
Rights Cases, 9 however, the Supreme Court, invoking classic public-pri-
vate assumptions, announced that the statute was an unconstitutional in-
trusion into the sphere of private social life. The limit to public
accountability had been exceeded, since the fourteenth amendment only
16. Eg., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (state "authorization"); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (state "regulation"); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 720 (1961) (state "involvement").
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1,2 (these sections were ruled unconstitutional in one
of The Civil Rights Cases, United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). See infra note 19 and accom-
panying text.
19. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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prohibits discriminatory action by the state. Not until the modem civil
rights movement, almost one hundred years later, would similar legisla-
tion again be enacted. Then, as we know, it was upheld. 0 Yet the change
in doctrinal result did nothing to undermine the basic proposition that
there was a line beyond which it was inappropriate to hold the public
accountable for racially discriminatory results. Thus, despite all of the
supposed legal advances in the area of anti-discrimination law, it is still
legitimate to treat concrete social facts like continuing high rates of un-
employment among minorities, high rates of poverty and basic exclusion
from mainstream American life as somehow outside the sphere of direct
public responsibility."1
The notion of a limit on accountability works powerfully, not just in
setting legal limits, but also in shaping our responses to the world we see.
For example, it allows us to experience the social reality of minorities
trapped in ghettos as a fact, however regrettable, of private rather than
public life. Therefore, it is something outside the range of our direct con-
cern, something about which we do not have to feel utterly outraged. As
a result, potentially direct responses of empathy are always distorted by
the assumption that the reality being witnessed lies in a realm of privat-
ism, beyond the scope of public concern.
This is not to say, of course, that the notion of privatism is the only
distancing mechanism at work on our perceptions. The older model of
divinely ordained hierarchy, now supposedly defunct, remains in the
form of stereotypical assumptions about lower classes, women and mi-
norities. "They" are not really like "us," they do not really mind what we
would mind, it is more natural for them to live like that. A more sophisti-
cated version of the hierarchical view, one more consistent with the pub-
lic-private split, is the notion of merit. The assumption is that there is a
20. Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act which prohibited discrimination in public ac-
commodations. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42
U.S.C. § 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982 & Supp. III 1984)). Lest precedent be too hastily
tampered with, however, the Supreme Court, in validating the law, relied not on the fourteenth
amendment, but instead on the federal power to regulate interstate commerce. See Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding the 1964 Civil Rights Act applicable to Ollie's Barbecue,
because the restaurant bought $70,000.00 of food from interstate sources).
21. Kenneth Casebeer emphasizes causation as the crucial construct in preserving the illusion of
the public-private split in recent state action cases. The relevant question has become whether dis.
crimination was caused, in some objective sense, by the actions of a state official. The effect is that
wrongs done within the permissiveness of the state, but not directly ordered or caused by officials,
are legitimated. Casebeer calls for a rejection of this image-building approach, and for a reunion of
power and responsibility which would redefine public-private and transform a notion of "public
autonomy" from oxymoron to status quo. Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step
by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379 (1983).
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natural ordering of abilities, one independent of class, sex or race, which
determines outcomes in a free society. Given equality of opportunity, the
skillful, the daring and the hard working will be the ones who come out
ahead. The belief in objective merit has of course played a key role in the
ideology of the free market-success in the marketplace reflects natural
ability rather than socially constituted hierarchy.
The point here, however, is that one can reject all such assumptions
about the legitimacy of social hierarchies, yet still be unable to transcend
the distancing effect of the public-private split. In fact, we are almost
inevitably trapped by it. Even if we attempt to recognize that the
problems of others are within the scope of our own concern, we hardly
know where to begin. In the absence of true, shared communal responsi-
bility, gestures of concern are quickly turned into idle, private and proba-
bly condescending acts of charity. If we donate money to toys for tots, or
to the church soup kitchen, we are, to be sure, providing a toy for a child,
or a meal for a hungry person. However, we are also affirming the regime
of nonresponsibility that makes the act of charity one chosen by subjec-
tive whim. Given the public-private split, we are forced to be selfish as
much as we are free to be selfish, for in the absence of a real community
we are pressed back into the world of our own private lives. In the pri-
vate realm, where free choice is presumably protected, not one of us is
free to choose the rejection of privacy itself, because others will quickly
respond to such efforts as intrusive, threatening or simply crazy.
This lack of freedom to choose a community of real sharing is
closely connected to the second notion that makes the public-private split
so effective-that of illusion. The belief in a public realm allows us to feel
that despite whatever goes on in the private sphere, at least in the public
we are together as citizens, participating equally and fully. The public
realm constantly holds out the possibility of community, even while the
reality of daily life denies it. Because those daily denials are taking place,
the ideal of public community must be constantly affirmed through the
social production of imagery, lest we directly confront our loneliness and
isolation. Community must seem to be experienced, even if it is not. The
media have become especially effective purveyors of this illusion, for the
shared television viewing of national events provides the feeling that we
are all participating together in national life. Although in fact we are
only passive viewers of an image, we feel that we are joined with others,
taking part in the life of the country. The recent Miss Liberty and Consti-
tutional Bicentennial celebrations provided a ceremonial version of that
illusory experience, but so-called national tragedies have a similar effect.
1987]
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President Reagan has been especially adept at using funerals for this pur-
pose, often masking underlying problems of corruption and ineptitude at
the same time, as with the attack on the U.S.S. Stark and the space shut-
tle explosion.22
As Reagan also seems to understand, the illusion of the public com-
munity may depend upon the periodic identification of enemies. Nothing
works quite so well as constituting a group through shared negative en-
ergy. The group hate serves neatly to buttress the illusion of togetherness.
We have seen it happen with Khomeni, with International Terrorism
and, most effectively, with Khadafy. Figures like Khadafy serve a useful
ideological purpose. However separate and private we are otherwise, at
least we can share our hatred for him as a nation- that is, as members of
a compensatory, illusory community.
Enhancing the image of public togetherness in turn facilitates the
third notion associated with the public-private split, the notion of legiti-
mation. With the illusion of togetherness intact in the public sphere of
our consciousness, in the private sphere it is acceptable to be acquisitive
and competitive, to scorn others and take advantage of their weakness.
Disparities of wealth and power that result from this social and economic
"bellum omnium contra omnes"23 are by definition legitimate because
they are a function of private, freely-willed choice, not the public exercise
of political power. To redress those disparities would be to invade the
protected sphere of private rights.
Legitimation requires an elaborate structure of law in order to main-
tain the theoretical distinction between public aid private activity. It is
the conception of legally enforceable rights which gives credence to the
22. President Reagan's adeptness at funereal-like ceremonies in general, and in the U.S.S. Stark
episode in particular, was noted in a report of the Stark incident in a weekly news magazine.
COFFINS COMING HOME: During his years in office, Reagan has endured several foreign
policy fiascoes, especially in the Middle East, and along the way, he has become an
expert practitioner of public grief. "This president has probably met more returning bod-
ies than any president in history," says a retired naval officer. Reagan's complete sincer-
ity and his natural flair for poignant ceremony save him from being skewered when his
own policies lead to disaster overseas and another shipment of coffins arrives home. But
this time the questions aren't likely to fade away. "We all want to know why did this
have to happen," said Ernestine Foster, whose husband, Vernon, died on the Stark, leav-
ing seven fatherless children.
A Tragedy in the Gulf, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1987, at 17. That Reagan's own grip on reality may be
tenuous at best may explain his skill in fashioning illusory images for a public desperately seeking
their reality. See generally G. WILLS, REAGAN'S AMERICA: INNOCENTS AT HOME (1987); M.
ROGIN, RONALD REAGAN, THE MOVIE: AND OTHER EPISODES IN POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY
(1987).
23. See supra note 10.
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assumption that private activity is in fact purely private, so that the exer-
cise of private power does not appear to be publicly sanctioned oppres-
sion. Thus, the public law promulgated by governing bodies exercising
sovereign authority in the public realm is clearly to be distinguished from
private law-property, torts, and contracts-which simply facilitates the
private ordering of social and economic life. Private law doctrine, in its
classic form, was thus a long and detailed meditation on the idea of pro-
tected free choice within judicially determined limits which also pro-
tected the rights of others. Legally determinable rights meant that each
person was secure as against both public coercion and oppressive private
power.
The private rights which are about freedom, however, are also nec-
essarily about exclusion. The possibility of liberty and free choice always
carries with it a negativity-this is mine, therefore it is not yours. I've got
it so you do not. Similarly, while there is a positive respect of another's
autonomy and right to choice in recognizing the other as rightholder,
there is a negativity to that respect, for it is always premised on the de-
nial of the freedom to share. "Because you have it, it is not mine; because
it is yours, I cannot have it without your consent." Of course, a major
premise of traditional marketplace theory was that consent was some-
thing that must be purchased, and thereby experienced as an alienating
barrier.
That the line between public and private is logically incoherent has
been apparent since the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s.
The realist scholars, part of the general twentieth-century revolt against
formalism and conceptualism,24 convincingly undermined all faith in the
objective existence of rights by challenging the coherence of the key legal
categories that gave content to the notion of bounded public and private
spheres.
Property, for example, is thought to be the paradigmatic private
right. In his famous essay, Property and Sovereignty, Morris Cohen
pointed out that property is necessarily public, not private, since prop-
erty means the legally granted power to withhold from others.2" As such,
it is created by the state and given its only content by legal decisions that
limit or extend the property owner's power over others: Thus, property is
an always conditional delegation of sovereignty, and property law is sim-
24. See generally E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURAL-
ISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE RE-
VOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1957).
25. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
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ply a form of public law. Similarly, with respect to freedom of contract,
the power to exclude or withhold is central to the supposedly freely en-
tered bargain. Free consent to the other's terms is in fact forced consent,
for it derives from the other's legally sanctioned threat to withhold what
is owned except upon the demanded payment.26 It is the state that dele-
gates the power to exclude and, therefore, to set the terms. Without pub-
lic coercion there would be no private freedom of contract. Thus, the line
between private right and public power dissolves, with the former col-
lapsing into the latter.27
Despite its apparent incoherence, however, the language of public
and private persists, both in legal discourse and as part of our experience.
Its continuing viability and power to legitimate may be due, in large part,
to its manipulability. It can easily be turned inside out precisely because
it has no logical content at all.28 The legal literature is filled, for example,
with theoretical invocations of public welfare, used to justify the consoli-
dation of what are merely hierarchical property relations. Therefore, in
the typical exclusionary zoning case, the supposedly free private market
would allow developers to subdivide building lots and erect cheap hous-
ing, in otherwise fancy, usually all-white, neighborhoods. In such situa-
tions the community is allowed to establish rules that prohibit such
unhampered irresponsible market activity, despite the fact that the com-
munity, with its police power, is being invoked simply to cement into
place the product of private, acquisitive, racist behavior. 9
Similarly, the public purpose doctrine has been invoked repeatedly
to justify subsidies to enterprises that otherwise claim the right to be
treated as private. Historically, railroads were notorious beneficiaries.
The state's eminent domain rights were granted to railway companies on
the theory that the public would benefit from an expanding transporta-
26. See Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUMBIA L. REV. 603 (1943);
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
27. Arthur Jacobson argues that the whole law of associations, agency, partnership, trust, joint
stock companies, corporations, and the "fundamental and pervasive concept of fiduciary relations"
can properly be understood only as a "distribution of sovereignty to private persons beyond the
precincts of the state apparatus." Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and
Associations in the Common Law, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 599, 600 (1980).Thus relations usually con-
ceived of as private actually involve direct participation in sovereignty, and "theories of state and
economy that divorce sovereignty from the daily business of private life are in error." Id. at 600.
28. For a history of the early development of the public-private distinction, demonstrating its
manipulability, see H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983).
29. See generally K. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION Or THE
UNITED STATES (1985) (development of suburbs as insular enclaves).
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tion system, even while the companies, of course, retained their right to a
private profit.3
Modem examples abound. Conventional free-market ideology extols
the virtues of private capital accumulation, entrepreneurial skill, and the
harsh reality of risk. Yet tax breaks are granted to entice industries to
invest or remain in localities. Cities compete f6r the opportunity to pro-
vide sports teams with ever more luxurious stadiums. Huge companies
get government help when they face financial ruin. Private companies
rarely turn down the opportunity to feed greedily at the public trough.
Two recent cases serve to illustrate the point.31 In Poletown Neigh-
borhood Council v. City of Detroit,32 the court invoked the public charac-
ter of large private enterprise in allowing a whole neighborhood in
Detroit to be destroyed, at a huge personal cost to displaced neighbor-
hood residents, so that General Motors could build a plant on that loca-
tion. The theory was that the public good would result from the plant's
opening, for of course the plant meant jobs. As companies bargain with
municipalities for favors, it is always the workers who are held hostage.
Conversely, however, in Local 1330, United Steelworkers v. U.S. Steel,33
an appellate court affirmed the privateness of large corporations and re-
fused to stop the closing of two plants in Youngstown, Ohio, despite the
court's stated awareness that the move would cause "an economic trag-
edy of major proportion" in the area.34 Rejecting the argument that the
local community had gained a recognizable property interest or commu-
nity "right" in the plants over the years, the court held that because the
company was privately owned, its economic decisions were beyond pub-
lic reach. 5
The point here is not that the courts got it wrong in attempting to
make their public-private decisions, but rather that anything can be de-
scribed as either public or private. Decisions during the 1985-1986
United States Supreme Court term illustrated that point vividly. The
Court refused to hold airlines sufficiently "public" to be required to com-
ply with anti-discrimination laws with respect to the treatment of the
30. See M. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 63-66 (1977).
31. We are grateful to our colleague, Fred Konefsky, for suggesting the juxtaposition of these
two cases.
32. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
33. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.
1980).
34. Id. at 1265.
35. Id. at 1281-82. For a detailed and insightful discussion of these issues, see Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
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handicapped, 6 despite the quite apparent subsidization of commercial
airlines through the air traffic controller system. Recall, however, that
when the air-traffic controllers went on strike and were subsequently
fired by President Reagan, the President specifically noted that the con-
trollers were part of a public service. He could not have fired them if the
controllers were part of the private sector.
Only a of couple of weeks later, in the infamous Bowers v. Hard-
wick 37 case, the Court announced that even voluntary consensual sexual
acts were not sufficiently private to preclude state regulation. While the
Act that was upheld was apparently directed against homosexuals, on
whom the Court has never conferred rights as such, the Court did not
seem to preclude regulation of sexual acts even between husband and
wife. In effect, that which seems at the experiential level most private-
sex-is declared public, while that which seems most public-air traf-
fic-is declared private. Paradoxically, the legal system defines the world
for us as public and private, informing every aspect of our lives. Then, in
its particular definitions, it is free to stand in dramatic contradiction to
our daily experience.
The indeterminacy, which helps to make the public-private split so
powerful as legitimation, is closely related to the fourth associated no-
tion, that of contradiction. As the airline-sexuality pairing demonstrates,
neither public nor private, as a category, has any objective content. 38 As
a result, contradictory arguments about whether or not something is a
private right can always be generated. As a matter of pure logic, nothing
is excluded from the state's legitimate concern for the public welfare.
Similarly, as between two conflicting private rights, logical arguments
can always be made for either side. My private right to be secure from
the invasion of a nuisance, like the smelly chemicals a neighbor sprays on
her lawn, conflicts with her right to use her property freely. My right to
be secure from oppressive competition conflicts with her freedom to en-
gage in unbridled freedom of contract on the market. The state cannot
36. United States Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
37. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), reh'g denied by Bowers v. Hardwick, 107 S.Ct.
29 (1986).
38. Karl Klare demonstrates both the indeterminacy and incoherence of the public-private dis-
tinction as it is used in the rhetoric of American labor law. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in
Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982). He also argues that "the use of such rhetoric obscures
rather than illuminates, and that the social function of the public-private distinction is to repress
aspirations for alternative political arrangements by predisposing us to regard comprehensive alter-
natives to the established order as absurd." Id. at 1361. He calls for a new vision of solidarity,
transcending the public-private split, which would simultaneously be a vision of autonomy-a "form
of social life that nurtures the capacity of every individual to experience self-realization." Id,
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simply protect rights, but instead must always decide between two per-
fectly logical and mutually exclusive rights.
The problem of contradiction has been written about elsewhere,
chiefly as impairing the legal system's claim to be a neutral protector of
rights.39 It also plays itself out at the level of experience, in our sense of
how we should relate to others. The contradiction between market free-
dom and security of expectations, which pervades private law discourse,
reflects deeply held beliefs about how we should act in the world. What
we find is that we end up believing in contradictory values. At one level
we believe we should be free to take advantage of another's weaknesses in
the market. On another level we feel obliged to act with some regard for
the interests of others. First-year law students are genuinely troubled
when they discover that contract law, for example, does not have a con-
vincing answer to the question of where self-interest should end and
where concern for another's security should begin. What their unhappi-
ness reveals is that they believe in both the free exercise of self-interest
and in the good-faith protection of others, and yet they know that they
cannot have it both ways. They then find themselves feeling immobilized.
How can one make a strong moral choice in the face of evident contra-
diction? What law students begin to recognize self-consciously is exper-
ienced by most people as an inarticulated sense of moral immobilization.
The fact that contradiction undermines the legal system's claim to
be a neutral protector of rights also intensifies the degree to which the
triadic structure of state/self/other pervades our relationships. At any
given time, one's position with respect to another has to be seen as a
function of a series of logically incoherent choices that the state has
made. These choices have sometimes been favorable and sometimes an-
tagonistic. If you complain about your neighbor's barking dog, the police
may give your neighbor a hard time, or they may tell you that barking
dogs are to be endured as a fact of neighborhood life. The police may
show up next time, having been called by your neighbor, and request that
you mow your overgrown weed-filled lawn. However, you may convince
them that you are an ecologist experimenting with a natural lawn. The
state always has had a past history as friend or foe, and always has a
potential future of favoring self over others, or vice versa. The fact that
those choices cannot be preordained, or logically compelled, makes the
presence of the state as a wielder of power more acutely felt.
Some commentators have pointed to a weakened legal confidence in
39. See, eg., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 685, 697 (1985).
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the distinction between public and private as it relates to economic ques-
tions.4° This is probably a legacy of the New Deal regulation of business
activity and the tenor of that era's Court, although the current Court
may be headed back in the direction of resurrecting the old bright-line
boundary between state and market. It is common, however, especially
among liberals, to consider some areas problematic while at the same
time assuming that there is some core, intrinsic meaning to the notion of
privacy, one that is natural rather than simply a creation of legal-political
ideology. Consequently, one might willingly concede that Con Edison is
not obviously and perfectly private, but what about my home, my body,
my thoughts?
Even in such cases, however, the supposed core right to privacy can
be collapsed into the utterly conventionalized contradictory arguments
made in the economic area. Therefore, my freedom to keep a goat in my
home and yard conflicts with my neighbors' collective right to be secure
in the respectability of the neighborhood in which they have invested.
Similarly, one person's right to the free enjoyment of sexual fantasy con-
flicts with another's right to be secure against degrading and exploitative
use of bodies. Moreover, as in the market, even within the family we can
have no faith in the supposed purity of private, subjective consent, be-
cause consent is always in part a function of role and social expectation.
A wife's consent to sexual relations with her husband, for example, is in
part publicly constructed. This is true since we inescapably act out the
social representations of the roles assigned to us. As a result, the wife's
consent is inevitably consent by a person who thinks of herself by refer-
ence to the category wife, and the publicly created consciousness of
"wife" informs even her most private, subjective decisions.41
If the structure of private right and state power renders incoherent
the vocabulary of rights, how then can we affirm the values that seem
most important to us? Feminists, for example, feel deeply divided within
themselves on the question of pornography. In the face of the debasing
use of female bodies we are tempted to seek protection. The state should
ensure our security as against exploitation, irrespective of the
pornographer's invocation of a private right to freedom of speech. Yet
the same state that might side with us on this issue could also end up as
40. See, eg., Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1349 (1982).
41. The example comes from Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152
(1985) (containing a thorough discussion of the public-private issue as an elaboration of the core
liberal dilemma of subject and object).
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the ally of the Phyllis Schlafflys of the world, who would oppress us with
their convention. Similarly, the same first amendment invoked by our
exploitative enemy may, in another situation, be our protector against
oppressive state power.42
In that sense, the triadic structure of self/state/other alienates us,
not just from each other, but from our own values as well. We think we
sense evil and domination, yet we feel disempowered by our very subjec-
tivity from asserting its existence and even from knowing what we really
believe. For that reason, paradoxically, at the experiential level the belief
in rights and protected, autonomous subjectivity in fact leads us to
doubt, rather than trust, our own beliefs. If we have nothing to go on,
except our own privatized subjectivity, the fear of the disapproval of
others is heightened. Consequently, rampant individualism may in fact
lead to tightened social conformity.43
That particular dynamic of privacy and conformity may serve al-
ways to undermine the freedom which the category of privacy theoreti-
cally protects. The freedom held out by subjectivity is so frightening, in
its imposition of awesome responsibility, that one is driven always to seek
objective answers from some authoritative other. As Foucault has
pointed out, for example, nothing in Western culture has been labelled so
deeply private and related to self as sexuality, yet nothing has been so
subject to social discussion and dissection.' The more intensely we feel
sexuality to be the most private thing there is about ourselves, the more
we are drawn to make it part of an incessant public discourse, obsessively
holding every detail up for public scrutiny.45
That final, paradoxical contradiction raises some difficult questions
42. Ruth Colker has argued that women, as an oppressed group, stand more to lose than gain
from the traditional legal conception of privacy, with its individualistic perspective. Colker, Pornog-
raphy and Privacy: Towards the Development of a Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusions of
Privacy, 1 LAW & INEQUALITY 191, 198-99 (1983). Focusing on the law's failure to protect women
in the area of pornography, she states, for example, that "[p]rivacy doctrine has confined women to
the private sphere, beyond-the reach of public law, beyond protection from offensive intrusions....
It preserves, protects, strengthens, masks, hides, distorts, and neglects women's sexual abuse." Id. at
198-99. She calls instead for a theory of group-based oppression, which, among other advantages,
would not exclude poor women from protection. Id. at 200-01. See also Colker, Published Consen-
tiess Portrayals: A Pioposed Framework for Analysis, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 39 (1986).
43. See R. BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE 146-63, 167-95 (1985).
44. See M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978).
45. Consider, for example, the visual assault of magazine and tabloid headlines at the typical
supermarket checkout counter: "The Role of Sexual Fantasy in the Lives of Nice Girls;" "Men Over
50 Can Have Multiple Orgasms;" "Foreplay: Those Sweet Tender Moments. A Thing of the Past?
Not if You Do This;" "Are You and Your Mate Sexually Compatible?"
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about the use of legal categories to promote social change and, ulti-
mately, about how we might begin to conceive of alternative human rela-
tionships with new and different notions of selves and others. A recent
New York City criminal case, People v. Graydon," illustrates these is-
sues. The defendant was arrested and charged with the crime of "sexual
abuse in the second degree," committed when he "repeatedly rubbed the
leg of an eleven year old girl prior and subsequent to her demands that he
cease."'47 The statutory definition of the crime required "sexual contact,"
which in turn required "the touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts."48 Thus the court had to decide whether the victim's leg was an
"intimate part."
The case raises some obvious and less obvious issues about legalism,
and ultimately, about the extent to which we are hopelessly caught up in
the public-private dilemma. First, the easier issues. The simplest way to
think about the case is as a problem in semantics. Does the definition of
"intimate part" include or exclude "leg?" The assumption here is that
people are free in the private realm to do whatever they want, unless the
law of the public realm says otherwise. To be guilty of unconsensual leg
rubbing in a context like the one in Graydon requires a prior announce-
ment by the criminal code that the conduct is not legal. Related to the
definitional approach would be concerns about rights of the accused, as,
for example, whether the statute was clear enough to give adequate no-
tice to persons contemplating the behavior that they might end up crimi-
nally liable. Thus, we cannot deal with the definitional issue even in
semantic terms until we decide whether the words must be strictly or
liberally construed. One quickly discovers that the issue cannot be dealt
with as a definitional matter at all. "Intimate part" is not an objective
feature of reality, but a question of social construction built on the al-
ways manipulable line between public and private.
At that point someone will suggest that we must consider the pur-
pose of the statute, since a well-trained legal mind could decide the case
by reference to purpose without pretending to find a formal definitional
answer. But what is the purpose? Is it to build a wall of protection
around the bodies of all eleven-year old girls from head to foot since
consent is not a defense? Or is it to divide the world of touchings into
46. People v. Graydon, 129 Misc. 2d 265, 492 N.Y.S.2d 903 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985),
47. Id. at 265, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 904.




innocent and not so innocent touchings depending on the part of the
body touched, or the intent of the violator?
At this point, a now somewhat outraged feminist will tell us, not
without justification, to stop the legalistic fussing. The feminist will con-
tend that what is really happening is that a disgusting male, steeped in a
sexist, patriarchical culture that regards the bodies of women, especially
young women, as arenas for the pursuit of male pleasure, is engaging in
degrading, exploitative behavior that serves to perpetuate traditional pat-
terns of domination over women. And if the purpose of the law is not to
stop that, it has no purpose at all. In fact, the easy answer to the defini-
tional problem is that the young woman's entire body is an intimate part.
But the story can be told differently. The court does have to choose
between conflicting claims: On one side, the girl's right to protected bod-
ily security; on the other, the man's right to freedom from interference
with spontaneous sexual behavior. All costs are reciprocal.49 To confer
security on the girl infringes on the man's freedom. To protect the man
in his choice restricts the girl's right to say no. One could also describe
the story as that of an otherwise lonely, isolated, sad man, a man accus-
tomed to no human contact at all, and merely reaching out toward some-
one in a furtive, hopefully anonymous gesture.
Many people do not even want to hear that version of the story. And
for good reason, given the social reality of abuse, sexual and otherwise, of
women and girls by men. But, in our society and culture, that takes us
right back to the public-private dilemma. The question that pervades this
case is how we relate to our own bodies. One model might be called the
conservative model. That model says that our bodies belong to the state,
or to God, with questions about our bodies being appropriate matters of
public decision making in the name of the moral authority of the state, or
the church. On that view, the state can decide that the bodies of eleven
year old girls are morally off limits, whether or not the individual in
question wills otherwise. That same state, however, could decide to ban
49. The point of reciprocity was most forcefully made by Ronald Coase, whose Coase theorem
is now the (in)famous foundation for the law and economics approach to legal decision making. As
part of his analysis, Coase pointed out that the recourse to commonsense notions of cause does not
adequately describe the imposition of social cost. For example, where a factory spews out offensive
smoke onto nearby houses, one is inclined to say that the factory owner is imposing a cost on the
residents. Nevertheless, it is equally true that if the residents successfully claimed a right to be free
from smoke, then they would be imposing a cost on the factory owner, who would be forced to move
elsewhere, pay for smoke prevention, or buy off the residents. Thus the relevant legal question is not
"should the factory owner be forced to pay for the cost she is imposing on the residents," but rather,
"which of the two parties--owner or residents-should be entitled to impose a cost on the other?"
See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
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abortions, or what it deems immoral sexual behavior between even con-
senting adults.
The conservative model is simply a decision that bodies, unlike, for
example, economic decisions about capital mobility or plant closings, are
on the public side of the public-private line. The liberal retort is not to
dispute the line, but to move it. The body then becomes one's property,
with which one can deal and consent, in a contractual way, to have
touched or intruded upon by others. The basic model, like private prop-
erty itself, is the exclusion of others, the primacy of mine, and an affirma-
tion of our alienated distance from one another protected and guaranteed
by the state. To assert privacy in the name of protecting our bodies
against oppression is still to assert the liberal worldview. "It's my body,
keep others away." "It's my factory. Keep the angry local citizens out
while I close it down, so I can move to the Mexican border and find
cheaper non-union labor."
On the other hand, one cannot dispute, and one should not demean,
the liberating force of "It's mine and you cannot touch it, or touch me"
as asserted, for example, by an abused wife invoking the state to control
and punish her abusive husband. In contexts of oppression, one cannot
deny the rhetorical and political power of the imagery of privacy."0 The
dilemma is the extent to which what generates a moment of liberation
soon serves to replicate, by use of the very same arguments, the world we
are trying to change.
Is there an even imaginable radical alternative view of bodies that
does not require us to go on living the public-private split? Two related
agendas suggest themselves. One is to recognize that the decision to em-
ploy the rhetoric of privacy is just that, a strategic move. The real prob-
lem is contexts of oppression, relations of domination that must be
undone, old habits of power that must be untrained. From that perspec-
tive, the issue is not the privacy of bodies as such, but how to fashion a
world without our current hierarchies of power, one of which is the phys-
ical abuse of women by men. That suggests the other agenda-the fash-
ioning of communities where one need not hide behind the private for
either protection or self-aggrandizement. Communities where relation-
ships might be just "us, you and me, and the rest of us," deciding for
ourselves what we want, without the alienating third of the state.5" In
50. For a vivid and chilling depiction of a setting so oppressive that the most minimal experi-
ence of privacy becomes the only basis of freedom, see M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE
(1986).
51. Our doubt about the degree we can trust one another, embedded in the public-private split,
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that setting, however remotely possible it may seem, .we might even make
group decisions about reproduction, replacing our pervasive alienation
and fear of one another with something more like mutual trust, or love.
leads to reliance on an outside authority to resolve the problem. Yet, so long as the authority re-
mains outside, the doubt cannot be overcome. See, eg., Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Con-
sciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563 (1984).
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